It is argued that while quantum mechanics contains nonlocal or entangled states, the instantaneous or nonlocal influences sometimes thought to be present due to violations of Bell inequalities in fact arise from mistaken attempts to apply classical concepts and introduce probabilities in a manner inconsistent with the Hilbert space structure of standard quantum mechanics. Instead, Einstein locality is a valid quantum principle: objective properties of individual quantum systems do not change when something is done to another noninteracting system. There is no reason to suspect any conflict between quantum theory and special relativity.
I Introduction
The opinion is widespread that quantum mechanics is nonlocal in the sense that it implies the existence of long-range influences which act instantaneously over long distances, in apparent contradiction to special relativity. There is a large and ever growing literature on this topic, so it is not practical to give more than a few representative citations. See [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] for some of the material advocating or defending nonlocality, and [16] for a helpful survey. There have been some dissenting voices, notable among them Fine [17, 18] -see [19] for additional references and a critique of Fine's approach-and de Muynck and his collaborators [20] [21] [22] . But dissenters are so few that they were not so much as mentioned in a recent popular account asserting that quantum nonlocality poses a serious problem for special relativity [23] . While most of the discussion has taken place among philosophers and physicists interested in the foundations of quantum mechanics, one does not have to look very far in the physics research literature or textbooks to find numerous claims that this or that experimental confirmation of quantum predictions demonstrates the possibility of "interaction free measurement," or the absence of "local realism" in the quantum domain, or some similar idea tied to quantum nonlocality. See [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . for a small but not atypical selection.
The relative rarity of dissent or rebuttals suggests that a large company of physicists as well as philosophers has come to accept the notion that the quantum world is full of nonlocal influences, and that this aspect of the theory is in accord with, or even supported by, current experiments. The claim has even been made, p. 18 of [12] , that such influences are so well established that not only are they a part of current quantum theory, but will necessarily be part of any future theory that makes the same predictions about certain experimental outcomes. Such certainty seems a bit surprising in view of theorems [31, 32] , whose validity does not seem to be in doubt, to the effect that these (supposed) quantum nonlocal influences cannot be used to transmit signals or information. Thus they are not detectable by any ordinary experimental test, and their existence must be inferred by indirect arguments. Are these arguments valid? That is an important question which has not received the consideration it deserves.
A serious problem with discussions of nonlocality, whether by advocates or opponents, is that the arguments have not, up till now, been rooted in a clear, unambiguous, and paradox-free formulation of quantum theory. This deficiency was pointed out in one of his last papers [33] by none other than John Bell himself. He was aware that such a formulation was not to be found in the textbook treatments at the time he wrote, and the situation has, unfortunately, not improved since then. What students are taught in courses in quantum mechanics are techniques for calculation, not the fundamental principles of the subject. The idea that a wave function collapses when a measurement is carried out, to take a particularly pertinent example, might represent something physical, in which case measurement processes are good candidates for producing nonlocal influences, but it might also be nothing but a technique for carrying out a calculation, something like a change in gauge, with no reason at all to associate it with anything physical, much less superluminal. Conclusions based upon shaky or incomplete or inconsistent formulations of quantum mechanics inherit, unfortunately, these same uncertainties.
The purpose of the present paper is to move beyond previous discussions by employing a fully consistent quantum mechanical approach, aspects of which are summarized below, to study the quantum (non)locality problem in a consistent way that leads to quite definite conclusions. We will argue, first, that there are quite precise ways in which quantum mechanics can properly be said to be nonlocal, in a manner which has no exact classical counterpart. Whether in view of this one should call quantum theory itself "nonlocal" is a different question. Second, we will argue that the supposed nonlocal influences do not exist, so the conflict with special relativity is completely imaginary. Third, we will establish on the basis of quantum principles a strong statement of quantum locality: the objective properties of an isolated individual (quantum) system do not change when something is done to another non-interacting system.
As serious conceptual scientific issues are seldom resolved by a straightforward analysis of arguments for or against a particular thesis [34] , we are not so naive as to believe that the material presented here will immediately result in unanimous consent with our conclusions. We do, however, hope to raise the level of discussion. For too long the topic has been debated in terms of "measurement" and "free will" and other concepts which, as Bell put it [33] , should play no role in a fundamental theory, and which at the very least make difficult the sort of precise analysis appropriate to physics as a mature, exact science. We claim it is possible to do much better, and if the reader is capable of doing better yet, so be it.
Our starting point for addressing the issue of nonlocality is the belief that quantum mechanics is at present our best fundamental theory of the mechanical laws of nature and applies universally to systems of all sizes, microscopic or macroscopic, from quarks to quasars, and under all conditions, whether it be an atomic nucleus, a quantum optics experiment, or the center of the sun. In some circumstances classical mechanics is an excellent approximation to a more fundamental quantum description, which is always available in principle, even though it may be very awkward to construct it in detail. In other circumstances classical mechanics is inadequate and one must have resort to a proper quantum description. Whenever classical and quantum mechanics are significantly different it is the quantum description that best describes the world as it is, and in this sense physical reality is quantum mechanical. The fact that the hydrogen atom cannot be described by the laws of classical physics does not make it any less real; what this tells us is that real reality is not classical reality. The attitude expressed in [35] , that we should be willing to revise our familiar concepts of reality to fit the teachings of quantum mechanics, has much to recommend it, and is the approach taken in this paper.
Although quantum and classical mechanics use many of the same words, such as "energy" and "momentum" and "position", the concepts are not exactly the same. Thus when discussing "location" or "locality" of things in the real (quantum) world, one needs to employ well-defined quantum concepts that make sense in terms of the quantum Hilbert space, and not simply import ideas from classical physics with vague references to some "uncertainty principle." Special relativity would have made little progress had Einstein restricted himself to using "time" in precisely the same way it is employed in pre-relativistic physics, and in the quantum domain one must be willing to allow quantum mechanics itself to suggest a suitable concept of locality, along with whatever limitations are needed to make it agree with the mathematical structure of the theory. Much of the confusion that attends discussions of quantum (non)locality arises from an attempt to use classical concepts in a quantum context where they do not fit, leading to internal inconsistencies.
The present discussion is also based on the assumption that quantum mechanics is fundamentally stochastic or probabilistic, and this stochasticity is the way the world is, not something limited to the special times or places at which measurements occur. Consequently, quantum laws, expecially those referring to dynamical processes, must be formulated in consistent probabilistic terms. At present the only known way to do this within the framework of Hilbert space quantum mechanics (without additional classical variables), with probabilities calculated from Schrödinger's unitary time development (without additional artificial "collapses" added to the dynamics) is to use the (consistent or decoherent) histories formulation [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] , which will be employed throughout this paper.
(Most of what follows can be understood without referring to the most technically demanding part of the histories approach, the consistency conditions, though these are used in the latter part of Sec. V and in the proof in Sec. VI.)
Our argument aims to clear up the confusion surrounding quantum (non)locality and put future discussions of this subject on a firm footing. It involves several steps. The first is to discuss the sense in which quantum mechanics allows nonlocal or entangled states, and the precise way in which these can be said to be nonlocal. This genuine nonlocality, the topic of Sec. II, needs to be clearly understood and clearly distinguished from the notion of a nonlocal influence of the sort mentioned above. The two have sometimes been confused, but they are in fact very different.
Following this comes a discussion in Sec. III of the Bohm version [45] of the famous Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) situation [46] , starting with a macroscopic version involving colored slips of paper, to which no one would ascribe any nonlocal influences, and going on to argue that very much the same analysis applies in the case of measurements on an entangled spin singlet pair. To be sure, spin measurements allow for additional possibilities that are not practical for slips of paper, and the issue is how to interpret them and what conclusions can be drawn. One can come to paradoxical conclusions by ignoring the principles of quantum mechanics, but the issue is fundamentally a local one; it is not nonlocal.
The majority of discussions of quantum nonlocality involve Bell inequalities [1, 3, 47] in some way or another. All are agreed that quantum mechanics predicts large violations of the Bell-CHSH inequality, and by now most physicists concede that experimental tests support the quantum predictions. There remains a significant difference of opinion as to what conclusions one should draw from this. On one side are those who claim that because locality is one of the assumptions that goes into the derivation of the inequality, its violation proves that the quantum world is nonlocal. Not just in the genuine sense discussed in Sec. II, but that there exist nonlocal influences. On the other side are those (including the present author) who believe that other assumptions contradict quantum principles, leading to an inequality that is incompatible with the quantum nature of the world. In the present paper we consider the Bell-CHSH inequality from two slightly different perspectives. First, in Sec. IV we derive it by a method which, while not exact from a quantum perspective can nevertheless be justified as a good enough approximation for all practical purposes in the case of golf balls. One can then see how the derivation breaks down because of noncommutation of operators in the domain where quantum effects can no longer be ignored. The noncommutation has to do with local operators.
Second, in Sec. V we take up the factorization and independence conditions on probabilities involving a hidden variable (or variables), denoted by λ in most treatments of the subject, which are often used in deriving the inequality, and ask how they apply to a very simple microscopic system represented by a quantum circuit involving four elements (all qubits in the simplest case). We insist that the probabilities be well defined and the hidden variables be represented by quantum mechanical projectors, so as to make the discussion relevant to the real (quantum) world. Using the circuit model one can ask about the possible existence of quantum hidden variables, properly defined quantum properties associated with subspaces of the Hilbert space, which can play the role of λ. It turns out that sometimes they exist and sometimes they do not exist, and this has very much to do with local incompatibility issues, i.e., (non)commuting operators, and nothing at all to do with mysterious nonlocal influences. Our conclusion is that this route to deriving Bell inequalities is not based on local realism, as is often claimed, but instead on an assumption of classical realism. This renders the Bell-CHSH inequality invalid for drawing conclusions about the real (quantum) world, in particular its locality or lack thereof.
Following these arguments we go on in Sec. VI to establish the positive result that objective properties of isolated individual systems do not change when something is done to some other noninteracting system. Thus not only does the claim for nonlocal influences in the quantum domain rest upon shaky arguments lacking a fundamental justification, it is also in flat contradiction to a result based on consistent quantum arguments. Claims such as [9, 23] , that supposed nonlocal influences make quantum mechanics a threat to special relativity (or the reverse) are, consequently, without foundation. Various implications of our results are discussed in the concluding Sec. VII.
In an article of modest length it is impossible to deal with all published arguments claiming that quantum theory is beset with nonlocal influences and in conflict with special relativity. In particular we do not discuss those based upon the GHZ [48, 49] or Hardy [50] paradoxes, nor Stapp's counterfactual arguments [51] . Both Hardy's paradox and the problems associated with importing counterfactual reasoning in the quantum domain are treated in some detail in Chs. 25 and 19, respectively, of [43] , from a point of view similar to that in this paper, and the conclusion regarding nonlocal influences is the same: there is no evidence for them. Also see [52] with reference to special relativity and quantum probabilities.
II Genuine Nonlocality
Many errors contain a grain of truth, and this is true of the mysterious nonlocal quantum influences. Quantum mechanics does deal with states which are nonlocal in a way that lacks any precise classical counterpart. Understanding the nature of this genuine nonlocality will help in identifying the misunderstandings which have given rise to the notion of spurious influences, so it is worth beginning with this topic. One does not need an entangled state, for the lack of this kind of locality is already present in a wavepacket ψ(x) for a single particle in one dimension. Imagine ψ(x) spread out over an interval x 1 ≤ x ≤ x 2 ; a continuous function that is nonzero at any point inside this interval and zero for all x outside this interval. The physical interpretation of ψ(x) depends on more than |ψ(x)| 2 , for two wavepackets ψ(x) and φ(x) may be such that |ψ(x)| 2 = |φ(x)| 2 , and yet be orthogonal to each other, which means that they represent distinct quantum properties. Thus the physical meaning of ψ(x) depends on relative phases or phase differences at different points in space. The same is true in relativistic quantum mechanics where the phase differences are at spacelike separate points. (Of course ψ(x) when viewed from a field theoretic or "second quantized" perspective is already an entangled state.) Similarly, entangled states of two spin-half ions in a trap, or two photons traveling away from a crystal where they were produced by down conversion, can properly be said to be nonlocal.
But in what sense are they nonlocal? Let us discuss this for ψ(x). Since it vanishes outside the interval [x 1 , x 2 ] it is localized to (or on) this interval, but inside the interval itself it is delocalized in the following precise sense. Let [ψ] = |ψ ψ| be the projector onto the subspace of the Hilbert space of square integrable functions that contains ψ(x), and X(x ′ , x ′′ ) the projector onto the interval
Since by assumption ψ(x) is nonzero throughout the interval from x 1 to x 2 , the projectors [ψ] and X(x ′ , x ′′ ) will fail to commute when x ′ or x ′′ is in the interior of [x 1 , x 2 ]. That is to say, the property of being "local," located within the interval [x ′ , x ′′ ], is incompatible in the quantum sense of noncommuting projectors with the property of being "in the state ψ" if the interval [x ′ , x ′′ ] is chosen injudiciously. Informally, the particle cannot be localized more precisely than the support of its wave function. Because the issue is one of commutation of operators, we are dealing with a feature of the quantum world which lacks any precise analog in, and which cannot be reduced to, classical physics. The essential point is not that a measurement of position will not yield a predictable result. While this is true, it is also true in the case of a classical particle described in classical statistical mechanics with a probability distribution. What is new in the quantum case is noncommutation. This needs to be recognized as such, not dismissed with a vague reference to an uncertainty principle. This sort of nonlocality is typical of entangled states when the entanglement involves objects or situations which are spatially separated from each other, as in the case of the spin singlet state
of two spin-half, spatially separated particles, where we assume that |+ corresponds to S x = +1/2 in units ofh, and |− to S x = −1/2, and the subscript indicates which particle. (This is the wellknown example Bohm [45] used to elucidate the EPR problem.) One cannot ascribe a property to the spin of particle A, such as S Ax = +1/2, if the combined system has the property of being in the state |ψ 0 . The relevant projectors do not commute, so the local property is incompatible with the property represented by the entangled state. In this quite precise quantum mechanical sense the state (2) can be said to be nonlocal when the two particles are in different locations as specified by the spatial parts of the total wave function. Nonlocality in this sense is just one manifestation of the quite general situation that arises when properties are defined using projectors on the quantum Hilbert space instead of subsets of points in the classical phase space, and different properties may correspond to projectors that do not commute, the hallmark of quantum in contrast to classical physics. Properties which are incompatible do not have a conjunction that makes physical sense. If P 1 and P 2 are two commuting projectors, then P 1 P 2 = P 2 P 1 is a projector representing the property "P 1 AND P 2 ." But if P 1 P 2 = P 2 P 1 , neither product is a projector, and there is no natural way (consistent with ordinary logic) of defining a corresponding "P 1 AND P 2 " property. See the discussion in Ch. 4 of [43] .
Quantum incompatibility manifests itself in various ways which are not directly connected with local properties. For example, it is incorrect to ascribe a property to the spin of the electron in a hydrogen atom in its ground state, of which (2) is the spin part, even though the electron and proton are not spatially separated but lie on top of each other (to the extent possible in the quantum world). Nontrivial unitary time dependence is described by states which are "nonenergetic" in the sense that the projector onto such a state at some given time fails to commute with the Hamiltonian, which is to say with the projectors making up its spectral decomposition. Similarly, wavepackets of finite extent are "nonmomentous" as well as being "nonlocal" in the sense described above.
Genuine quantum nonlocality thus refers to descriptions of quantum systems in terms of their local properties, or perhaps the incompatibility of such properties with the specified quantum state. By contrast, the notion of nonlocal influences, also called spooky action at a distance, superluminal influences, etc., refers to a (supposed) dynamical effect: what is done to a certain quantum system here can have an instantaneous influence on a second system located far away, be it at the other end of the laboratory or (in principle) the other side of the galaxy. Nonlocal properties, which are very much part of the quantum world, do not by themselves imply the presence or absence of nonlocal influences. However, as we shall see, various claims that quantum theory contains nonlocal influences can reflect a failure to take adequate account of certain local manifestations of quantum incompatibility.
III Correlations Not Causes
Charlie in Chicago takes two slips of paper, one red and one green, places them in two opaque envelopes, and after shuffling them so that he himself does not know which is which, addresses one to Alice in Atlanta and the other to Bob in Boston, both of whom know the protocol Charlie is following. Upon receipt of the envelope addressed to her Alice opens it and sees a red slip of paper. From this she can immediately conclude that the slip in Bob's envelope is green, whether or not Bob has already opened his envelope, or will ever do so. Her conclusion is not based on a belief that opening her envelope to "measure" the color of the slip of paper has some magical long-range influence on the color of Bob's slip. Instead it employs statistical reasoning in the following way.
Before Alice opens the envelope she (or Bob or Charlie) can assign probabilities to the various situations as follows:
where A = R means a red slip in Alice's envelope, B = G a green slip in Bob's, etc., and Pr() refers to the joint probability distribution. From the usual rule for conditional probabilities, Pr(
and this is the conditional probability distribution that Alice uses to infer the color of Bob's slip knowing that the one in her envelope is red. One could say that she uses the outcome of her observation to "collapse" the initial probability distribution (3) onto the conditional probability distribution (4) . The colors of the two slips of paper, the ontological situation in the physical world, is not at all affected by Alice's "measurement." It is her knowledge of the world that changes, in a way which we do not find at all surprising. The "collapse," if that is what one wishes to call it, refers to a method of reasoning, not a physical effect. Next consider a situation in which Charlie at the center of the laboratory pushes a button, and one member of a pair of spin-half particles initially in the entangled state (2) is sent towards Alice's apparatus at one end of the building, while the other is simultaneously sent towards Bob's apparatus at the other end. If Alice measures the x component of spin of her particle and the apparatus indicates A = 1 corresponding to S x = 1/2 before the measurement took place-let us assume that Alice is a competent experimentalist who has designed and built a piece of apparatus which can do a measurement of this sort-what can she say about S x for Bob's particle? The chain of probabilistic inference is identical to that discussed earlier for colored slips of paper, though, as we shall see, certain details must be discussed with greater care.
In order to use probabilities in quantum theory in a consistent way it is necessary to specify, as in every application of probability theory, a sample space [53] of mutually exclusive possibilities: one and only one of which occurs in any particular experimental run. Two incompatible properties of a quantum system cannot both be included in the same sample space since they are not mutually exclusive. This makes choosing a sample space for spin half particles more subtle than the corresponding problem for slips of paper, even though in principle the two problems (viewed from a quantum perspective) are similar. The other novelty for spin half is that there are various different incompatible sample spaces one may wish to consider, whereas for slips of paper there is in practice no need to consider alternatives to the usual quasiclassical framework: [38, 39, 44] and Sec. 26.6 of [43] . Note, incidentally, that choosing the sample space is part of setting up a stochastic or probabilistic theoretical model of the situation, and the reality being modeled is no more influenced by the physicist's choice of a sample space than would the flow of traffic on the Pennsylvania Turnpike be influenced by someone in the Department of Transportation setting up a stochastic model thereof.
Quantum sample spaces are always (projective) decompositions of the identity I on the quantum Hilbert space, and for the problem under discussion it is useful to use the following four projectors corresponds to S Ax = +1/2, and S Bx = −1/2. The four projectors are mutually orthogonal, so represent mutually exclusive events, and add up to the identity I A ⊗ I B on the spin space of the two particles, thus covering all possibilities. We are interested in the corresponding probabilities at a time t 1 when the particles are close to but before they reach the measuring apparatuses, the counterpart of a time before the envelopes are opened in the case of slips of paper. The probabilities associated with the events in (5) can be calculated in the following way. Assume Charlie has constructed an apparatus which will reliably produce the spin state |ψ 0 in (2) at some time t 0 < t 1 , and that the quantum unitary time development operator T (t 1 , t 0 ) from time t 0 to t 1 for the spin degrees of freedom is the identity, so
One may then use the Born rule
to assign a probability to any of the properties Q in (5) at the time t 1 , with the result
The probabilities in (8) are the analogs of those in (3), and by using them Alice can apply exactly the same form of statistical reasoning as in the case of slips of paper. If her observation (apparatus) indicates that the particle arriving at her end of the laboratory had S x = +1/2 just before the measurement took place, as reflected in the measurement outcome, she can infer that the particle arriving at Bob's end of the laboratory had S x = −1/2 just before his measurement took place. Thus the mode of statistical reasoning is identical for spins and slips of paper once an appropriate sample space has been adopted and the probabilities calculated by the rules of quantum dynamics for the system under consideration. At this point a number of comments are in order.
1. Why discuss spins of particles at a time before any measurements took place? Because measurements of this type can have violent effects on the properties measured. In a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, for example, there is no reason to suppose that the spin of the particle after the measurement, when the particle may have been destroyed to is stuck to a glass plate, is the same as before. In the case of measurements which preserve a property, so that it is the same after the measurement as before, one can of course also consider the spin state after the measurement, but in general this is not possible.
2. Why suppose that the macroscopic outcome of Alice's reflected a property which the particle had before the measurement took place? It is possible in principle to analyze the action of the apparatus in fully quantum mechanical terms, and show that for an appropriately constructed apparatus, having properties which should be satisfied if it is constructed by a competent experimentalist, the S x values before the measurement and the pointer position after the measurement are appropriately correlated: the latter indicates the former. See Chs. 17 and 18 of [43] . Of course this is not the sort of argument which will convince every sceptic, but it is the sort of reasoning which physicists apply to experimental results all the time. The issue is analogous to what one meets in astronomy: why does the image on the CCD accurately reflect the light coming in from the sky? One needs to understand how the apparatus works.
3. Could not Alice have measured S z instead of S x , by using a modified apparatus? Yes, and in that case the measurement outcome using the appropriately constructed apparatus would have provided no information about the value of S x , and she would be able to say nothing at all about S x for Bob's particle. But couldn't she have used the outcome to say something about S z for Bob's particle? Yes, but to do so would have meant employing a sample space different from, and incompatible with, that in (5). Alice has a choice in determining what it is she measures, and this choice determines what she can say on the basis of the measurement outcome about properties of Bob's particle. Later, Sec. V B, we will construct a toy model of what it means for an experimentalist to make a choice, and analyzing this model can aid understanding. But in no case does Alice's choice of which measurement to do have any influence whatsoever on any property of Bob's particle: this will be demonstrated in Sec. VI.
4. An important conceptual point relates to the role of |ψ 1 as defined by unitary time development in (6) and used in (7) . When employing the sample space (5) at the time t 1 , |ψ 1 cannot be considered a physical property of the particle system at this time, because [ψ 1 ] does not commute with the projectors in (5). Instead it enters (7) as a calculational tool, a device for computing probabilities, a pre-probability in the terminology introduced in Sec. 9.4 of [43] . Failing to distinguish a ket as a calculational device from a ket as a physical state (more properly, the state is the projector onto the ray containing this ket) is a source of considerable conceptual confusion.
5. Cannot the same probabilities be calculated by collapsing a wave function? They can, and wave function collapse should be considered a calculational device, a means of computing probabilities, often conditional probabilities, that can be obtained equally well by other methods with less spectacular names. The careless use of "collapse" ideas has led to all sorts of conceptual difficulties and paradoxes which can be avoided if one is careful about setting up sample spaces and calculating quantum probabilities according to well-defined fundamental principles. On the other hand, collapse can be a very useful computational tool. Suppose that Alice has measured S x = +1/2 for her particle. She can then use |ψ 1 to compute a "conditional" ket |− B = √ 2 +| A |ψ 1 , in a somewhat awkward use of Dirac notation, for the spin state of Bob's particle, thought of as a pre-probability. This conditional ket provides a fast way to calculate probabilities of outcomes of Bob's measurements if they are made in some basis other than the [±] B of (5). An equally good approach, though it takes a trifle longer, is to carry out the "collapse" by taking the partial trace over A of the operator (
The point is that "collapse" is one way of carrying out a calculation using a stochastic model, following the standard rules of probability theory, and has nothing to do with any mysterious influence from one end of the laboratory to the other.
6. Both in the case of slips of paper and in the case of spin half, Alice can, quite properly, assign a different probabilistic description to the world after she knows the outcome of her observations than she can before. This difference could be manifested in assigning a different wave function (as in the previous paragraph) or a different density operator, or in various other ways. What is surprising is not that this possibility arises in quantum mechanics, which has long been regarded, at least in practice, as a stochastic theory, but that its existence can still be a source of surprise; see [54] .
7. Suppose Alice has her apparatus set up to measure S x and obtains some value, which she, as a competent experimentalist, believes to be the value possessed by this component of the spin angular momentum of the particle before the measurement took place. But she could instead have measured S z , and in that case she would have reached the conclusion that S z had a particular value. Thus not only did S x have the value actually measured, but it must also have had some value of S z , the value that would have been measured in the counterfactual world in which the apparatus was set up to measure S z . Is this not paradoxical?
The reader familiar with the original EPR paper [46] will immediately recognize in this the sort of argument by which they concluded that quantum mechanics is incomplete, except that now it is entirely a "local" matter having to do with just one particle. The weak point in such reasoning is its counterfactual character; see the discussion of quantum counterfactuals in Sec. 19.4 of [43] for an analysis of what can go wrong. The problem is always some violation of the single framework rule, some mixing of arguments from incompatible sample spaces. Thus an argument, as in the preceding paragraph, which starts off with S x and ends up discussing S z for the same particle at the same instant of time cannot be embedded in a single sample space, and is thus an attempt to apply reasoning appropriate to classical physics in a context in which it doesn't work.
To summarize this section before going on to additional topics. The correlations of the Bohm-EPR sort are similar to and can be understood using probabilistic reasoning of the same sort involved in the analogous situation involving colored slips of paper, where no one would ever suggest the existence of nonlocal influences. The analysis in both cases has to be carried out using a properly defined sample space. For slips of paper viewed quantum mechanically there is only a single quasiclassical sample space that needs to be taken into account in practice. Although the quantum physicist can very well imagine other possibilities (e.g., with slips of different colors in some macroscopic or Schrödinger-cat superposition) they are of no practical interest. By contrast, alternative incompatible sample spaces are relevant to possible laboratory experiments on spin half particles (or correlated photons), so choosing the sample space-a choice made by the physicist, not by some "law of nature"-is not automatic, and care must be exercised not to mix conclusions based on incompatible sample spaces.
IV Golf Balls
be the algebraic signs, ±1 or 0 of these components. In a probabilistic setting in which L Aa and L Bb are random variables one can define a correlation function
where · denotes the average taken with respect to the joint probability distribution. The Bell-CHSH inequality [1, 3, 47 ]
where a and a ′ are denote two (in general different) components of the spin of particle A, and b and b ′ are similarly defined, is a consequence of the following straightforward argument. Define the random variable
From (10) and the linearity of · one sees that the left side of (11) is | W |. Since W depends on each of the four quantities A a , A a ′ , B b , and B b ′ in a linear manner it follows that if each of these is confined to the range [−1, +1], the maximum and minimum of W must occur when each is +1 or −1, and then by looking at the various possibilities one sees that W itself is confined to the interval
Since the average of a quantity that always lies between −2 and +2 falls in the same range, we have demonstrated the correctness of (11). Thus (11) follows at once from the definitions in (9) and (10) through a straightforward application of standard probability theory. It has nothing to do with how the golf balls were set spinning in the first place, or how the components were measured (if they were measured), and nothing to do with locality or location. To be sure, it is hard to imagine two golf balls on top of each other at the same location, but it is easy to imagine that A and B are the same golf ball at a single location but at two different times, in which case (11) will again be valid.
This derivation was carried out using classical physics. Let us see what happens when we try and "quantize" it by replacing L Aa and L Bb with the corresponding quantum operators J Aa and J Bb (in units ofh), with commutation relations
and so forth. Replace (9) witĥ
where P A+1 is a projector onto the subspace of the Hilbert space spanned by eigenvectors of J Aa with positive eigenvalues, P A−1 onto those with negative eigenvalues, and the Q's are similarly defined using J Bb . LetŴ be the operator obtained by putting hats on the symbols on the right side of (12) . It is Hermitian, since theÂ's commute with theB's, and therefore if its eigenvalues fall within the interval (13) the quantum average W will fall within the same range, and we again arrive at (11) . Alas, (13) no longer holds if W is replaced byŴ . What is wrong with the derivation immediately preceding (13) in the quantum case, i.e., if we put hats on the A and B symbols? This is seen most easily by considering the extreme case where A and B are spin-half particles. Suppose that a = z and a ′ = x, so thatÂ a andÂ a ′ become the noncommuting Pauli operators σ z and σ x , and also let b = z and b ′ = x. One sees that the spectra of the individual operators lies in the range [−1, 1], the same as with the classical random variables assumed previously. However, because the operators no longer commute the "subtraction" trick by which the last term in (12) in effect "cancels" one of the preceding terms no longer suffices to restrict the spectrum ofŴ to the range (13). To summarize, while classical reasoning can often be applied in the quantum domain and still yield correct results, there are occasions in which it fails and one has to employ the correct quantum tools.
Note that the failure has to do with noncommuting operators: were it the case thatÂ aÂa ′ = A a ′Â a the argument leading up to (13) would still be correct, though one would want to reword it in the language of operators rather than classical random variables. Thus we have to do with an argument which is valid in the classical domain, but whose quantum counterpart breaks down. Note that this the breakdown has no connection with anything nonlocal. TheÂ operators commute with theB operators, but not among themselves. To be sure, in order to violate (11) we have to consider a situation in whichÂ a fails to commute withÂ a ′ andB b fails to commute withB b ′ . But this is no sign of nonlocality; it merely shows that physicists sometimes get away with careless arguments.
Despite the foregoing remarks one can still justify the application of (11) to golf balls through the following chain of reasoning. Let us take the commutation relation (14) and divide it by the total angular momentum quantum number J so that it becomes
in terms of "normalized" dimensionless operators L Ax = J Ax /J, etc., which are then of order 1 in a typical situation. As J for a spinning golf ball is of the order of 10 30 , we see that noncommutativity is in practice not likely to be of much concern. Thus while the derivation of (11) is, strictly speaking, wrong even for golf balls, there are circumstances in which we are justified in saying that it holds as an excellent classical approximation, valid for all practical purposes when discussing macroscopic objects, or even spinning molecules if they are not too small. And as with all classical approximations, we are not surprised if (11) breaks down in a situation where those approximations are no longer valid. There is actually another serious defect with the attempt to derive (11) in the quantum case along the lines suggested above, by placing hats on the operators that appear in (12) . The difficulty is that (12) is then a sum of noncommuting Hermitian operators. While it is formally true that the sum of the averages is equal to the average of the sums, this hides a conceptual difficulty: what is the average that one is talking about? Students of quantum theory learn that placing a Hermitian operator inside angular brackets brings good marks on the examination, but there is empirical evidence [55] that they do not understand what they are doing. (We may count it fortunate that no similar research has been carried out on their instructors!) A proper use of probability theory requires that a sample space be specified, and while in quantum theory this is often implicitly taken to be defined by the eigenspaces of the Hermitian operator in question, that is obviously problematic when taking the sum of noncommuting operators which may have no eigenspaces in common. Sometimes an effort is made to evade this problem by claiming that the only probabilities being referred to are the outcomes of measurements. But then one must pay serious attention to how measurement outcomes are related to measured quantities, as in the discussion in the following section.
In summary, the Bell-CHSH inequality is one of many results in classical statistical physics which do not always hold in the real (quantum) world. It can be derived from quantum principles provided one makes approximations which in many situations will be valid for all practical purposes in the case of macroscopic objects. Nothing in the classical or quantum derivations gives the least suggestion of any nonlocal influences.
V Hidden Variables V A Factorization and independence
Bell's inequality can be derived provided the probabilities for a certain set of random variables satisfy two equations. The first is often called "locality" but we will refer to as the factorization condition:
The second is the independence condition
In a formal sense we are dealing with five random variables A, B, a, b, λ, and the probabilities in these equations are marginal probabilities obtained from a "master" distribution Pr(A, B, a, b, λ). Summing over some variables yields the marginal distribution, e.g. Pr(A, B, a) = b,λ Pr(A, B, a, b, λ), for those which remain, and conditional probabilities are defined as usual.
In the present application A and B are to be thought of as macroscopic measurement outcomes, taking values between −1 and +1, on two separated but perhaps correlated systems A and B, while a and b refer to the types of measurements carried out; e.g., settings of knobs that determine which properties of A and B are measured in order to yield the outcomes A and B. The interpretation of the hidden variable (or variables, but it is quite adequate to use a single discrete variable) λ is much less clear, and that is the essential topic to be discussed. One usually thinks of it as some sort of microscopic state associated with the systems to be measured before the measurement takes place. Hopefully its significance will become clearer in the following discussion. Its only role in the derivation of Bell's inequality (11) is that it exists in such a way that (17) and (18) are satisfied.
The first step in obtaining (11) is to combine (17) and (18) to yield
which we leave to the reader as an exercise in probability theory. Especially to any reader who supposes that (19) is a consequence of (17) alone without the additional assumption of (18)-a mistake made by none other than Bell himself [1] , and which caused a certain amount of confusion. Next-compare with (10)-define
where
are quantities lying in the interval [−1, 1], given that both A and B are in this range. Consequently, using the same argument that leads to (13), we conclude that
lies in the interval [−2, 2]. Thus multiplying (22) by Pr(λ) and summing over λ leads to the Bell-CHSH inequality (11) . Since, as noted earlier, (11) does not hold in general in the quantum world, it follows that there are circumstances in which either (17) or (18) or both fail, which is to say one can find no quantum hidden variable λ such that both conditions are satisfied. Before going further it is worth remarking why one might expect both of these to hold in circumstances in which classical physics gives an excellent approximation to quantum mechanics. Imagine that the golf balls of Sec. IV have been shot out in opposite directions from a machine that has first set them spinning in opposite senses about some randomly chosen axis. Next, measurements of different components of angular momentum are carried out by competent experimentalists, so the outcomes A and B reflect properties of the golf balls just before the measurements took place. One would expect these measurement outcomes to show correlations: Pr(A, B | a, b) as determined experimentally would not be equal Pr(A | a) Pr(B | b). But if λ is the hidden variable ( L A , L B ) corresponding to the actual angular momenta of each of the golf balls just before measurements take place, one would expect (17) to hold-each of the terms is either 0 or 1-for a properly constructed apparatus. And (18) is the plausible assumption that L A and L B are functions of the initial preparation of the golf balls and the air resistance they have encountered on their way to the measurement apparatus, but are not influenced by the settings of apparatus knobs, which could have been selected by a random number generator at the very last moment.
V B Quantum circuit
What goes wrong with (17) or (18) in the quantum world? Rather than attempt an abstract discussion it is helpful to set up a specific model, shown in Fig. 1 as a quantum circuit in which time increases from left to right [56] . The four horizontal lines represent D-state quantum systems or qudits, but all the essential ideas are present for the D = 2 qubit case, think of spin-half particles. They undergo interactions shown by boxes connected to vertical lines. The total Hilbert space
is the tensor product of those for the individual particles. Different times t j in the order t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < t 3 are indicated in the figure by dashed vertical lines.
In Fig. 1(a) a and b are ancillary systems used to generate different types of measurements, and kets in the corresponding orthonormal (standard or computational) bases are denoted by |a and |b , with a and b taking on the values 1, 2, . . .. (Note that (quantum) computer scientists prefer to start the count at 0 rather than 1, a matter of indifference for the present discussion.) The square boxes U and V connected to vertical lines represent the gates, or unitary operations,
carried out on H a ⊗ H A and H b ⊗ H B , respectively. Hence the total unitary time development from time t 2 to t 3 corresponds to the operator
while T (t ′ , t) on any other time interval is determined by the usual composition rule
and the fact that T (t 1 , t 0 ) and T (t 2 , t 1 ) are simply the identity I on H. The D symbols in Fig. 1 denote measurements and the dashed lines at later times in (b) denote the "classical" measurement outcomes. In a fully quantum description the measurement apparatus must itself be described in quantum terms; see, for example, Chs. 17 and 18 of [43] . Including the apparatus Hilbert space(s) produces no problem in principle, but doing so adds nothing (except technical complications) to the following discussion. We shall simply assume, as in most quantum information discussions, that the measurements are ideal: there is a one-to-one correspondence between the pointer positions, represented schematically by dashed lines, and the prior values of the measured qubits (or qudits). Thus |a = 1 at t 3 in Fig. 1(a) or t 1 in (b) leads to a measurement outcome or pointer position which can also be denoted by a = 1, and likewise for the b qubit. In the case of A and B we adopt a slightly different convention in which the qubit kets are labeled by ±1, thus kets |A = 1 and |A = −1 will lead to measurement outcomes A = 1 and A = −1, since this is what we have been using when discussing Bell's inequality. Figure 1 (b) differs from (a) in that the measurements on the ancillary systems a and b have been carried out at an earlier time, just after t 1 , and the classical or macroscopic outcomes are used to determine which unitary operation to apply to A or B. It is well known [57] that the circuits (a) and (b) yield exactly the same measurement statistics, the same joint probability distribution Pr (A, B, a, b) . For the present discussion the advantage of (b) is that it provides a quantum model for a situation in which the type of measurement, that is, the a and b value, is determined at the very last instant t 2 before the measurement takes place through what is in effect flipping a quantum coin. By choosing the state |φ a to be a superposition of the |a states, the value of a at t 2 , which determines which type of measurement will be carried out on A, is decided at the very last instant; similarly for the B side. As we shall see, this guarantees that (18) is satisfied for the hidden variables of interest to us, allowing us to focus on (17) .
But in what sense does the value of a determine the type of measurement? Applying a unitary transformation U (a) to the particle A and then measuring it at time t 3 in the standard basis is completely equivalent to measuring it at time t 2 in a different basis consisting of the states obtained by applying U (a) † to the standard basis |A = ±1 . This principle is by now well accepted in the quantum information community, and the reader not familiar with it is invited to check it by working out some examples.
Assuming an initial state at time t 0 of the form,
and using the circuit in Fig. 1(a) , we can calculate the joint probability distribution of interest at time t 3 by using the Born rule,
where square brackets indicate projectors, [a] = |a a|, etc., and
One can also write
where |Ψ 2 = T (t 2 , t 0 )|Ψ 0 , and
are projectors obtain by mapping [A] and [B] backwards in time from t 3 to t 2 , so they correspond to the measurement bases "chosen" by the quantum coin flips. Since there are no gates between t 0 and t 2 in Fig. 1(a) , one can replace |Ψ 2 in (30) with |Ψ 0 , and simplify the resulting expression to give 
Note that for a fixed a {P (a)
A } is a decomposition of the A identity,
Analogous comments apply to the Q (b)
B . Using (33) and its analog for B one can sum both sides of (32) over A and B to obtain Pr(a, b) = Pr(a) Pr(b), i.e, these variables are statistically independent, an obvious consequence of our choice of a product initial state |φ a ⊗ |φ b in (27) . This means that the choice of measurement on the A side is not only random, but also uncorrelated with the choice of measurement on the B side.
V C Quantum hidden variables
Following this somewhat lengthy introduction to the circuit in Fig. 1 let us now use it to search for quantum hidden variables. Based on the discussions of Bell's inequality in the literature it is reasonable to look for some counterpart of λ at a time t 1 preceding that at which the quantum coins, Fig. 1(b) , are flipped to "choose" what types of measurements will be carried out on A and B. We shall assume that λ is to be associated with some property or properties of the A and B particles at this time, as this makes for a relatively simple (though by no means trivial) discussion, rather than allowing it to also refer to properties of the ancillary systems or measuring apparatuses [58] .
Given that we need a fully quantum mechanical description of the situation and that the properties of interest are associated with three successive times: t 0 < t 1 < t 2 , a quantum histories approach is necessary, as this is the only known way to carry out a consistent probabilistic discussion in such a situation within the framework of standard quantum mechanics. There is, of course, no sense in which λ can be "measured" in order to produce probabilities in the usual textbook approach, since we are assuming that the measurement apparatuses do not interact with the systems of interest until later. In the notation introduced in Ch. 8 of [43] the simplest quantum sample space of histories associated with Fig. 1(a) will be of the type
Thus an initial state [Ψ 0 ] at t 0 is followed at t 1 by one of the properties represented by a projector Λ λ , where the collection {Λ λ } for different λ, hereafter denoted by Λ, constitutes a decomposition of the identity I AB , and at t 2 we allow the properties corresponding to A, B, a, b as in (30) . (One could also use the circuit in Fig. 1(b) ; the essential results are the same but the analysis becomes more complicated because the [a] and [b] events must be replaced with measurement outcomes.) The rule for assigning probabilities to such a family of histories can be written in terms of an interference or decoherence functional [39] J (A, B, a, b, λ, λ
which is to be interpreted as follows. The first equality defines what is, in effect, a collection of m × m matrices with indices λ and λ ′ in the case in which the decomposition {Λ λ } contains m elements. For each possible value of A, B, a, and b there is such a matrix, The second equality is the requirement that each of these matrices be diagonal: all off diagonal elements, λ = λ ′ , must vanish, in order for the interference functional to define a probability. Provided this consistency (or decoherence) condition is satisfied, each diagonal element defines a probability in the master distribution Pr(A, B, a, b, λ), from which all the others, in particular those that occur in (17) and (18), can be calculated.
It is important to notice that, just as in classical statistical physics, there is not a unique choice of sample space, and thus no unique choice for the projectors in Λ = {Λ λ }. The question of interest is therefore whether there exists some Λ such that the consistency conditions are satisfied (as otherwise probabilities are not defined), and such that the factorization and independence conditions, (17) and (18), are also satisfied. This requires a consideration of various possibilities, some of which are taken up in Sec. V D below.
Since we are assuming, as discussed above, that the hidden variables refer to the AB subsystem, it is convenient to introduce the states
on H A ⊗ H B and rewrite (35) in the simpler form
If consistency is satisfied, summing both sides over A and B, and using using (33) and its counterpart for B, lead to the result
where Pr(λ) = Φ λ |Φ λ . This means that the independence condition (18) is satisfied. Thus we need only consider the factorization condition (17) , which can be written as
where for any operator R on
To summarize up to this point. We are looking for quantum hidden variables, a decomposition {Λ λ } of the identity on H A ⊗ H B which can be part of a consistent family of histories, that is to say
and in addition (39) holds for all values of A, B, a, b and λ.
V D Examples
A full exploration and characterization of quantum hidden variables, understood as decompositions {Λ λ } of I AB for which the consistency conditions of families such as (34) are satisfied, and hence can be part of a consistent quantum description of the joint probability distribution of these particles as a function of time, is outside the scope of the present paper. Sometimes quantum hidden variables exist satisfying the factorization and independence conditions (17) and (18), and sometimes they do not exist; it depends on the initial state |Φ of the AB system and the types of measurements which are carried out, as determined by the U (a) and V (b) operators. We shall only consider a small number of possibilities, but from these one gets a fairly good idea of what the issues are.
1. The choice
that is, a projector onto the initial state |Φ together with its negation, is implicit in von Neumann's discussion of measurement [59] , see Sec. 18.2 of [43] , and hence in much subsequent work. It leads to |Φ 1 = |Φ and |Φ 2 = 0 in (36) . Consequently the consistency conditions (37) are always satisfied. But factorization, a single equation (39) with λ = 1, will typically not be satisfied. In such cases we can conclude that (42) is not a quantum random variable satisfying the factorization condition. We cannot thereby conclude that there are no quantum hidden variables satisfying factorization and independence, but only that if there are, they are not of the form (42) . The reason for this cautionary note appears in the next example. 2. Suppose that for all a and all A the projectors in the collection {P (a)
A } commute with each other. They can then be simultaneously diagonalized using a single orthonormal basis {|α j }, and one can choose as hidden variables the projectors
onto these basis states. The consistency conditions are satisfied and the states |Φ λ of (36) are product states,
so the factorization condition is satisfied: (39) holds for every λ = j. Thus under these circumstances appropriate quantum hidden variables exist, and Bell's inequality will be satisfied. Note that had we used (42) instead of (43) B } commute with each other, is worth mentioning in that one will need a different set of quantum hidden variables, {I A ⊗ [β j ]} for an appropriate orthonormal basis {|β j } of H B , to establish a factorization condition. It is typical of quantum theory that sample spaces have to be chosen differently in different circumstances, in contrast to classical physics where one can always in principle employ a common refinement of the sample spaces of interest, and thus reduce everything to a single sample space.
3. There are, as is well known, instances in which Bell's inequality is violated. One of the simplest is when a, b, A, B are all two-level systems or qubits, |Φ is the singlet state (2), the P The contrast between examples 2 and 3 is particularly instructive in analyzing why a derivation of the Bell-CHSH inequality is sometimes possible and sometimes fails in the quantum context. The key to example 2 is that all the projectors in the collection {P (a)
A } commute with each other. It is frequently the case that when operators for physical quantities or properties that are of interest commute, or at least almost commute with each other, one can successfully get away with classical reasoning applied to a quantum problem, as in the case of the golf balls in Sec. IV. On the other hand, classical reasoning tends to break down in situations in which noncommutivity is too large to be ignored. The commutativity of interest in the present circumstance has to do with local operators referring to properties of A (or B in the mirror image of example 2), not nonlocal operators such as the [Φ] that projects on an entangled state. Therefore these examples lend no support to the idea that quantum mechanics implies mysterious nonlocal effects or influences. Instead, it is quantum incompatibility, whether local or nonlocal, that is the central issue.
In summary, the factorization and independence conditions (17) and (18) whose conjunction leads to the Bell-CSHS inequality can be studied from a quantum perspective provided one can find appropriate quantum properties associated with the hidden variable λ, properties which must satisfy the consistency conditions in order to have well defined probabilities. Sometimes hidden variables exist for which (17) and (18) are satisfied, and sometimes they do not exist. But their nonexistence is no indication of the existence of long range influences. Instead, it is one more example of the fact that the quantum world does not obey the laws of classical physics.
VI Genuine Locality
Let us define Einstein Locality in the following way [60] Objective properties of isolated individual systems do not change when something is done to another non-interacting system Before presenting the argument that this is a valid quantum principle let us again consider the example of red and green slips of paper in Sec. III. Alice's opening her envelope, looking at the slip of paper to see what color it is, and then dropping it into her files or into the fireplace has absolutely no effect on the properties of the slip of paper in Bob's envelope, including its color. It is her knowledge of what is in Bob's envelope, not the objective properties of that slip of paper, that changes. Spacelike separation in the relativistic sense is not required; it is only necessary that the one envelope or its contents not interact with the other. One could, for example, imagine a very sophisticated arrangement in which one envelope is equipped with a radio transmitter and the other a receiver coupled to a device which releases a dye that changes the color of the slip of paper. Placing the two envelopes at a sufficient spacelike separation from each other during the time interval of interest would, of course, prevent that sort of signaling. but relativity is not the real issue.
Quantum theory describes properties of a system using (projectors on) subspaces of the appropriate Hilbert space, and as noted in Sec. II, incompatible subspaces cannot be combined to yield meaningful properties. Hence a meaningful quantum discussion of objective properties of an isolated system requires the use of a framework containing those properties (or their projectors), and this will necessarily exclude other incompatible frameworks from the discussion. The very concept of Einstein locality requires frameworks in which those properties of the isolated system we are concerned about have some meaning, as otherwise it is obviously impossible to discuss whether they do or do not change.
A quantum system A can be said to be isolated from another system B provided the overall time development operator for the two systems is of the form T A (t ′ , t) ⊗ T B (t ′ , t) during the time interval of interest. Deciding whether an objective property of A will change when something is done to B is best discussed using a third system C that "does" the something, which is to say it interacts with B but not with A. Thus we assume an overall dynamics of the tripartite system of the form
And in order to study the effects of what C does to B we assume an initial state of the form
at t 0 , and ask whether properties of A are altered by using different initial states |φ C for C. Consider a particular sequence of properties A (α j ) j of A at a succession of times t j during which it is isolated, so (45) applies. The joint probability distribution can be calculated using the interference or decoherence functional [39] -see also see Sec. 10.2 of [43] and compare with (35)-
where α stands for α 1 , α 2 , . . ., the chain operator K(α) is defined by
and
is the reduced density operator of A at t 0 . If the interference functional J (α, α ′ ) vanishes whenever α j = α ′ j for some j, which is to say the consistency conditions are satisfied, its diagonal elements provide the probabilities of the corresponding histories of the A system. The point is that neither consistency nor the resulting probabilities depend in any way on the choice of the initial state |φ C for system C, because ρ A , (49) , is independent of |φ C . This completes the argument that whatever is done to the system B has absolutely no effect upon any of the properties, or a time sequence of such properties, of the non-interacting system A. The reader who prefers to see how things work out in a particular instance, rather than relying on the general proof given here, will find an example in Sec. 23.4 in [43] .
VII Conclusion
The basic conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows. Although quantum theory involves the use of nonlocal states, such as wave packets and entangled states, there is nothing in the theory, or in the real world so far as it is accurately described by quantum theory, that corresponds to the sorts of instantaneous nonlocal influences which have often been thought to arise in the situation envisaged in the EPR paradox, or implied by the fact that quantum theory violates Bell inequalities. When quantum mechanics is consistently applied using properly formulated probabilities on properly defined sample spaces the complete absence of such nonlocal influences can be shown in two ways.
First, derivations of Bell inequalities, while valid for all practical purposes in a macroscopic situation in which the appropriate quantum projectors commute, fail when the classical approximations to quantum theory are no longer valid. Therefore it is not surprising that they are violated by quantum theory as applied to suitable microscopic objects. What this violation tells us is not the locality breaks down, but rather that classical physics no longer applies in the quantum domain. To be sure, the analysis in this paper only applies to some particular derivations of these inequalities, but there is no reason to believe that others escape the fundamental difficulties which we have identified: the unjustified use of classical ideas, in particular the careless use of probabilities, in the quantum domain.
Second, the same techniques that reveal deficiencies in derivations of Bell inequalities can be used to demonstrate in a positive sense a principle of Einstein locality which directly contradicts any notion of nonlocal influences. That such a principle is correct is hardly surprising given that even the most enthusiastic proponents of nonlocal influences have conceded that these cannot be used to transmit signals or information. The advance represented by the formulation used in the present paper is that confusing ideas and possible loopholes associated with an ill-defined concept of "measurement" have are absent from the discussion, and no longer provide a screen behind which such supposed influences can conceal their nonexistence. Nonlocal influences cannot be used to transmit signals for the simple reason that there are none.
Our results indicate that spurious nonlocal influences arise from mistaken reasoning, from applying classical modes of analysis in the quantum domain where they do not apply. While the fundamental source of the problem was pointed out some time ago by Fine [17] , the tools for dealing with it decisively using a fully consistent formulation of quantum probabilities have only been developed more recently. These allow a much more precise discussion of the problem than was possible in the past.
Whatever difficulties may remain in reconciling quantum mechanics and special relativity have nothing to do with the spurious nonlocal influences thought to arise because of the mistaken application of Bell inequalities to the quantum domain. Certain alternatives to standard Hilbert space quantum theory, in particular the de Broglie Bohm pilot wave approach [61] and the spontaneous localization scheme of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [62] , are known to possess a basic incompatibility with special relativity. However, standard quantum mechanics when give a consistent stochastic interpretation does not suffer from these problems, contrary to claims in some popular (e.g., [23] ) as well as more technical (e.g., [9] ) discussions. (For more details on how probabilities can be consistently introduced into relativistic quantum mechanics see [52] .)
The analysis in this paper implies that claims that quantum theory violates "local realism" are misleading. To be sure, quantum mechanics allows entangled states which are incompatible with, as discussed in Sec. II, certain local properties. That this disagrees with intuitions based upon prequantum physics is obvious, but why refer to the latter as "realistic"? It is the quantum world, not the classical world, which is the real world according to modern physics. And quantum mechanics is in full accord with the principle of Einstein locality stated in Sec. VI. Now it is true that a science can survive despite misleading terminology-"heat capacity" in modern thermodynamics, in which heat is no longer regarded as a fluid, comes to mind as one example. Nonetheless, there is much to be gained by adopting terms which reflect rather than stand in disagreement with our best current scientific understanding of a subject. It would be quite appropriate to say that quantum theory contradicts "classical local realism," or, better yet, "classical realism." It is classical realism, not local realism, that is in serious disagreement with the best experimental results currently available.
One wonders whether the energy expended discussing nonlocality might not be better used for investigating what is genuinely mysterious and surprising about quantum theory in contrast to classical physics: quantum incompatibility. Whereas entangled states that are incompatible with local properties provide one manifestation of this, there are many others. The subject is not well understood, either at the mathematical or the intuitive level, and is nowadays an area of active research in the field of quantum information. Thus it is incompatibility rather than nonlocal influences that deserves attention by those interested in the foundations of quantum mechanics. We have a situation in which one can honestly say that truth is stranger, but also a lot more interesting, than fiction.
